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Abstract
To what extent does the cultural composition of a society impose a constraint on its
long-run growth potential? We study this question in the context of an innovation-based
model of growth where cultural attitudes are endogenously transmitted from one generation
to the next. Focusing on attitudes regarding patience, we analyze the two-way interaction
between economic growth and the intergenerational transmission of patience. Exploiting
this interaction, we compare the long-run growth performance of a culturally heterogeneous
society where patience is initially underrepresented in the population with a culturally
homogeneous society where all agents are perfectly patient. Our main result is that in
the absence of any intrinsic preferences of patient parents to transmit their attitudes to
their children, the development paths of the two societies are bound to diverge, with the
culturally heterogeneous society experiencing lower growth rates. Yet, if patient parents
ceteris paribus prefer their children to be patient like them, we show that the two societies
can in the long run grow at the same rate.
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1 Introduction and Overview
The potential role of culture in inuencing the process of economic development across societies
and time has always been a subject of great debate among economists and other social scien-
tists. Commonly held views range from those of Marx (1859), who viewed a societys culture as
simply a superstructure reecting but not a¤ecting the material conditions under which a soci-
ety is operating, to those of Weber (1905), who considered the Protestant Reformation and the
sweeping cultural changes that followed it across Europe as planting the seeds for the continents
subsequent Industrial Revolution. Traditionally, the majority of economists tended to abstract
from cultural elements in their analyses, considering values and attitudes to be adjusting quickly
to changes in the underlying economic structure. In recent years, though, a growing literature
within economics has documented strong and persistent inuences of various cultural attributes
on economic development, thus indicating that such attributes may display substantial inertia.1
In this paper we seek to reconcile these di¤erent views on the role of culture by proposing a
simple model of endogenous growth and cultural change that allows us to investigate the extent
to which the cultural composition of a society will impose a constraint on its long-run course of
economic development. Out of possibly many cultural attributes that are deemed important for
economic development, we focus our analysis on time preference (patience).2 We do so given the
central role of patience in intertemporal decision making and the attention that it has already
received in the literature.3
Our model economy is a closed economy populated by overlapping generations of agents who
over the course of their lifetime need to make choices regarding human capital accumulation and
occupation. The engine of growth in the economy lies in a competitive research and development
(R&D) sector that employs skilled labor and produces quality-improving intermediate inputs that
are employed in the production of a unique nal good as in Aghion and Howitt (1992). Because
of its skill-intensity, employment in the R&D sector requires a minimum skill level. Hence, in
order to be employed as researchers, agents need to make investments in human capital early in
life. The extent to which agents will do so depends on how patient they are and this creates a
link from the distribution of patience in the society to its rate of economic growth.
At the same time, the distribution of patience across generations is not xed, but evolves en-
dogenously as parents take deliberate actions to socialize their children. Specically, we assume
1See Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) or Fernández (2010) for a comprehensive survey of the literature on
culture and economic behavior as well as Beugelsdijk and Maseland (2011) for a less technical overview.
2In the present paper we use the term patience to refer to the rate at which individuals discount future costs
and benets. This is occasionally interchanged with the terms time preference and time discounting, although, we
acknowledge that these concepts are not necessarily equivalent. For more on this point, see Frederick, Loewenstein,
and ODonoghue (2002)
3The link between patience and economic growth has a long history in economics, going back at least to
classical economists such as Adam Smith and John Rae. Recent summaries of the literature on this topic can be
found in Frederick, Loewenstein, and ODonoghue (2002) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2013).
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that the transmission of patience across generations is governed by the cultural transmission
mechanism of Bisin and Verdier (2001). Parents are imperfectly altruistic toward their children.
They care about their childrens future well-being resulting from their occupational choices, but
they ceteris paribus prefer their children to share their own attitudes regarding patience. More-
over, parental socialization requires e¤ort, which comes at a cost. Thus, parents make their
socialization decisions optimally by balancing out the costs and benets of transmitting their
attitudes to their children. In particular, given the presence of di¤erent employment opportu-
nities available, parental socialization e¤orts will depend on the relative returns to skilled and
unskilled labor in the economy. Hence, the current economic environment will inuence the
future distribution of patience in the society.
This two-way interaction between the mechanics of cultural transmission and economic growth
in the model allows for the joint determination of the distribution of patience in the economy and
the rate of growth. Exploiting this interaction, we compare the long-run growth performance of
a culturally heterogeneous society where patience is initially underrepresented in the population
with a culturally homogeneous society where all agents are perfectly patient. This comparison,
although extreme, is instructive as it allows us to assess the importance of the constraints on
economic development imposed by di¤erences in the degrees of patience.
Our main result is that the relative economic performance of the two societies will depend in
a surprising way on the strength of the intrinsic preferences of parents for children sharing their
cultural attributes. Specically, if socialization decisions are solely based on parental perception
of future expected returns to skilled and unskilled labor and parents do not care whether their
children share their cultural attributes, the development paths of the two societies will diverge. In
the culturally heterogeneous society patience will remain underrepresented and skilled labor will
be scarce relative to the cultural homogeneous one, limiting R&D employment and economic
growth. However, if patient parents carry an intrinsic preference to instill patience in their
children beyond the perceived economic benets of doing so, divergence between the two societies
is not bound to happen. Instead, it is possible for the culturally heterogeneous society in the
long run to grow at the same rate as the homogeneous one.
An important implication of our analysis is that it o¤ers a reconciliation between the ndings
of authors such as Algan and Cahuc (2010), Tabellini (2010), Nunn and Wantchekon (2011),
and Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010), whose work indicates that di¤erences in cultural values
and attitudes have persistent e¤ects on economic outcomes, with those of Fernández, Fogli, and
Olivetti (2004), Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), Di Tella, Galiani, and Schargrodsky (2007)
and Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009), who show culture to be malleable and adapting to changes
in economic conditions. In the context of our model economy, we show that di¤erences in the
prevalence of patience across societies can have long-lasting e¤ects on comparative economic
development, notwithstanding that these attributes are not xed but subject to change from
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generation to generation. Thus, culture can shape the process of economic development, despite
its ever-evolving nature. This is because the process of cultural change hinges crucially on
intergenerational linkages and the degree of attachment that parents have to their culture.
In addition to its implications for the role of culture in the process of economic development,
our analysis also contributes to the literature on the cultural transmission of values and atti-
tudes. Following the seminal of work of Bisin and Verdier (2001), several authors have studied
the intergenerational transmission of cultural attributes related to altruism (Jellal and Wol¤,
2002), corruption (Hauk and Saez-Marti, 2002), trustworthiness (Francois and Zabojnik, 2005),
or civicness (Michau, 2013).4 Our work di¤ers from the aforementioned contributions as it stud-
ies the implications of cultural transmission in the context of a fully specied macroeconomic
model, which enables the analysis of the general-equilibrium e¤ects of cultural change on eco-
nomic growth.5
Furthermore, our analysis of how patience evolves over the course of economic development
is related to earlier contributions by Hansson and Stuart (1990), Falk and Stark (2001), Doepke
and Zilibotti (2008) and Strulik (2012). Among those, closest to ours is the approach of Doepke
and Zilibotti. They also allow patience to be intergenerationally transmitted, with parents
inuencing the degree of patience of their children in expectation of their future lifetime income
patterns. In contrast to our model, though, the authors consider a dynastic optimization problem
where children follow the same occupation as their parents.6 Abstracting from intergenerational
linkages, Strulik (2012) suggests a di¤erent mechanism for the evolution of patience that is
based on an introspective approach in the spirit of Becker and Mulligan (1997) where individual
agents become increasingly more patient as they get richer. Finally, Hansson and Stuart (1990)
and Falk and Stark (2001) indicate how the process of natural selection over the course of
economic development will give rise to more patient individuals through genetic transmission.7
This approach has also recently been championed by Clark (2007) who stresses the downward
mobility of upper class descendants during the Middle Ages to account for the increase in patience
observed in Britain prior to the Industrial Revolution.8
In what follows, we begin our analysis with a description of the production structure of our
model economy in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the occupational choice problem of agents
4See Bisin and Verdier (2010) for more details and further references to related studies.
5In a related paper Klasing (2012) employs a similar structure to study the general equilibrium e¤ects of the
cultural transmission of risk aversion for entrepreneurial activity and growth.
6Thus, in Doepkes and Zilibottis model, the evolution of patience over the course of economic development
is driven by dynasties who become increasingly more patient as they face steeper lifetime income proles, and
not by a di¤usion of patience within the population as in our case.
7A similar approach has also been recently invoked to analyze the evolution of several other cultural attributes
which are central to the process of economic development, such as preference for o¤spring quality rather than
quantity (Galor and Moav, 2002), body size (Dalgaard and Strulik, 2011) as well as risk aversion (Galor and
Michalopoulos, 2012).
8Given that genetic selection forces operate over a much longer time horizon compared to cultural transmission
forces, we view the genetic and cultural approaches to the study of the evolution of patience as complementary.
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and the resulting steady state equilibrium in the context of a homogeneous society. In Section
4 we introduce cultural heterogeneity and the cultural transmission mechanism, and analyze
the resulting changes to the model economys equilibrium. Finally, in Section 5 we turn to a
comparison of the equilibrium development path of the culturally heterogeneous society with that
of the homogeneous one. A set of concluding remarks stemming from our analysis are o¤ered in
Section 6.
2 Production Structure
The production side of our model economy features a three-sector structure in the tradition of
Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), which is used
in most innovation-based models of endogenous growth. It comprises a nal-goods sector, an
intermediate-goods sector and a research-and-development (R&D) sector, each of which are de-
scribed below.
2.1 Final-Goods Sector
In period t, the unique nal good, Yt, is produced by a large number of competitive rms using









The technology combines unskilled labor LUt together with a continuum of intermediate goods
x indexed by s: Intermediate good variants di¤er in terms of quality and this is captured by
the productivity parameter At(s): Final good producers employ unskilled labor and intermediate
goods in order to maximize their prots, leading to the inverse demand functions










where wUt corresponds to the real wage earned by unskilled workers and pt(s) to the price of
intermediate good s relative to that of the nal good.
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2.2 Intermediate-Goods Sector
Intermediate-good production transforms the unique nal good into the di¤erent intermediate
good variants. The production process of each variant takes place under perfect or imperfect
competition depending on whether in a given period and for a given variant a new vintage has
been invented or not. In the former case, there is a unique rm that holds the patent for the
new vintage and is able to produce it with the simple one-for-one technology xt(s) = Y Xt (s):
This implies, given the demand for intermediate goods from the nal-goods sector, that the
prot-maximizing price that the patent-holding rm would like to charge is pt = 1 .
9
Following Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti
(2006) we assume that the patent holder is constrained by a competitive fringe of imitators that
can produce an alternative version of the latest vintage of the intermediate good, albeit at higher
marginal cost of  > 1 units of the nal good. This implies that the competitive price of these
alternative versions would be pt = : Letting  < 1 we have a situation where the patent-holding
rm is not able to charge the prot maximizing price of 1

; as the nal-good producers would then
opt for the imitatorsproduct. Hence, the rm is forced to charge the competitive price, which
keeps the imitators out of the market and still allows for some positive prots. These prots,
however, only last for one period. In the subsequent period, the incumbent monopolist retires
and the production is taken over either by the competitive fringe or by a new incumbent that has
succeeded in inventing and patenting a new improved vintage of the intermediate good.10 In either
case, the above set of assumptions guarantee that all intermediate good variants are priced at
pt = ; independently of how the market for each variant is structured. The quantities produced

















The productivity At(s) of each intermediate good variant depends on its vintage. New vintages
of intermediate goods are assumed to yield a quality improvement of a xed factor  > 1 over
the immediately previous one. Each new vintage is the result of an intensive research and
development process undertaken by competitive rms employing skilled labor. The outcome of
9This solution can be obtained from the rst-order condition of the monopolists prot maximization problem,
maxfxt(s);Y Xt (s)gfpt(s)xt(s)   Y Xt (s)g; after the inverse demand for xt(s); equation (3), has been substituted in.
Because the optimal price is the same for all variants we subsequently drop the reference to s:
10This assumption is in line with our overlapping generations structure and is important because it allows us to
eliminate prots from older intermediate good vintages. For more details on the rationale behind this assumption
the reader is referred to Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006).
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this process is uncertain, with t(s) denoting the probability of a new vintage of intermediate





At(s) w.p. 1  t(s)
)
: (6)
The arrival probability t(s) of a new vintage is assumed to depend on the number of skilled
workers employed in the research and development process, LSt (s); their human capital level ht




Skilled labor di¤ers from unskilled labor in terms of human capital. Specically, we assume that
skilled laborers are characterized by a human capital level ht > 1; which contributes positively
to the R&D process, while unskilled laborers whose human capital level is normalized to 1 are
not employable in the R&D sector.
The development of new vintages of intermediate goods is motivated by the prospects of
acquiring a patent for it and earning the resulting prots. Assuming that entry into the R&D
sector is free and that potential entrants are all risk neutral, in equilibrium all active R&D rms
will earn zero expected prots. Thus, the allocation of resources in the research sector will be






where wSt (s) denotes the wage paid per unit of employed skilled labor. Incorporating expression
(7), we obtain that wSt (s) = t(s): Assuming additionally that the labor input of each skilled
worker employed in the research sector contributes symmetrically toward R&D activities across









Under the above assumption the innovation process is ex ante symmetric across intermediate
goods and the corresponding probabilities of success statistically independent. Thus, by the law
of large numbers the total number of successful innovations is deterministic and simply equal
to: ^t = htL
S





LSt (s)ds corresponds to the total supply of skilled labor in the
economy.
11Alternatively, this assumption can be justied if R&D rms engage in research and development activities
that are not focused on any particular intermediate good variety. Either of the two assumptions reect the
potential synergies that may exists between R&D activities across intermediate goods.
7
2.4 Wages and Growth Rates
As the above description indicates, productivity growth in our model economy is driven by
vertical innovations yielding higher-quality intermediate-good inputs. Moreover, the symmetric
structure of the innovation process across sectors implies balanced productivity growth at the
aggregate level. Specically, letting At =
R 1
0
At(i)di be the average productivity parameter, we
have that the economy-wide rate of technological progress, gt, is deterministic and given by:
gt  At+1   At
At
= (   1)htLSt : (10)
Substituting (5) into (9) and writing the latter in terms of the aggregate productivity parameter
At we obtain the following expression for the wage rate of skilled labor:








Substituting (4) into (2) we obtain a similar expression for the wage rate of unskilled labor:






Given these wage rates, in what follows, we analyze the occupational choices of agents between
skilled and unskilled employment and the implications that these have on productivity growth.
To develop some intuition regarding the link between occupational choice and the mechanics of
growth, in Section 3 below, we rst discuss the case where there is no cultural heterogeneity
among agents. This will also provide us with a useful benchmark for subsequent comparisons.
3 A Culturally Homogeneous Society
Suppose our model economy is populated by overlapping generations of identical agents. Each
generation consists of a constant mass L of individuals who live for two periods. Time evolves
discretely, which implies that the time index t = 0; 1; 2;    also reects generations. During
their rst period of life, childhood, agents have one unit of time at their disposal, which they can
allocate between human capital accumulation and leisure activities. In their second period of
life, adulthood, agents have to decide whether to work as skilled or unskilled -supplying one unit
of labor inelastically in either case- and then consume all their labor earnings. Reproduction of
agents is asexual with each agent giving birth to one child in the beginning of the second period
of life.
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3.1 Lifetime Utility and Human Capital Accumulation
Agents derive utility from their leisure time during childhood as well as their level of consumption
during adulthood, which they discount at the rate   1: Specically, for an agent who is an
adult in period t we postulate the following lifetime utility function:
u(lt 1; ct; ) = ln lt 1 +  ln ct; (13)
where lt 1 indicates leisure during childhood and ct indicates consumption during adulthood,
which equals earned income.12
Time not spend on leisure activities in period t  1 is used to accumulate human capital. In
the spirit of Bils and Klenow (2000) we consider human capital, ht; to be formed in a Mincerian
fashion with ht = e (1 lt 1), with  > 1 capturing the returns to education. The assumed human
capital formation function reects the above made distinction between skilled and unskilled
labor. Agents who spent their whole unit time endowment during childhood enjoying leisure
will be characterized by a human capital level of 1 and can only be employed in the nal-good
sector as unskilled laborers, earning income wUt : Agents who as children devote some time to
accumulate human capital will as adults be characterized by ht > 1 and can be employed in
the R&D sector as skilled laborers, earning income wSt ht: In particular, agentshuman capital
accumulation decisions will be governed by the following lemma:
Lemma 1 For   1
 
; any agent planning to work as skilled will optimally choose during child-
hood to enjoy leisure bl() = 1
 
and accumulate human capital h^() = e  1= independently of
the level of wSt : Agents planning to work as unskilled will not accumulate any human capital.
For  < 1
 
; all agents will optimally choose bl() = 1 and h^() = 1 and as a result will opt for
unskilled employment.
Proof. The result follows from the maximization of the agents utility function (13) after substi-
tuting in ct = wSt ht and ht = e
 (1 lt 1) or alternatively ct = wUt ; noting the boundary condition
that lt 1  1:
3.2 Occupational Choices and Equilibrium Growth Rate
In the context of the above described objective problem of agents, their lifetime utility maxi-
mization e¤ectively hinges on their occupational choice. Although in a culturally homogeneous
society all agents are ex ante identical, in equilibrium agents will di¤er in their occupational
choices. Some will choose to accumulate human capital and work as skilled while others will
12The utility function is parametrized in terms of the discount factor, ; which in the subsequent section will
be allowed to vary across agents.
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not invest in human capital and work as unskilled. Specically, for the share of agents in each
occupation we can derive the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Assuming that L > (1 )( )
1=
( 1)h^() , there is a time invariant share ^ > 0 of adult
agents who work as skilled. This share depends positively on the elasticity of output with respect
to intermediate goods, ; the discount factor, ; the cost gap between innovators and imitators,
; the productivity of R&D, ; the returns to education,  ; and the size of the economy, L; and
is given by:









Proof. When making their occupational choices agents will compare their lifetime utilities as
skilled and unskilled workers. Let vSt 1() denote the indirect utility of an agent born in period
t   1 and employed in period t as skilled and vUt 1() the corresponding indirect utility of an
agent working as unskilled. In the rst case, as explained in Lemma 1, the agent will in the rst
period of life enjoy leisure l^() and accumulate human capital h^(): This leads, given the wage





+  ln(wSt h^): In the second case, the
agent will not to accumulate any human capital during childhood, earn wage wUt as an adult
and enjoy the lifetime utility vUt 1() =  ln(w
U
t ): Substituting expressions (11) and (12) for
skilled and unskilled wages in each respective expression and equating the two we obtain that
the economys share of skilled employment is constant across time and equal to expression (14).
Note that ^() < 1 as otherwise wSt will be zero while w
U
t would be positive, implying that
vSt 1() < v
U
t 1(): The assumption made on the population size L guarantees that ^() > 0:
The comparative statics results follow straightforwardly from di¤erentiating (14).
Having documented the constancy of the equilibrium share of skilled employment at any
point in time it follows naturally from the analysis of Section 2 that starting from period zero the
economy will experience a constant rate of productivity growth. Given the production structure
of our model economy, this implies that in equilibrium the economy will be on a balanced growth
path with income, consumption and wages growing at the rate of productivity growth given by
expression (10). We summarize this result in the form of a corollary to the above two lemmata.
Corollary 1 A culturally homogeneous society where all agents discount the future at the rate
 will at any point in time grow at the constant rate g() = (   1)h^()^()L:
4 A Culturally Heterogeneous Society
Let us now extend our analysis to the case of a culturally heterogeneous society where agents di¤er
in their degree of patience. For simplicity, let us assume that the population L consists of two
types of agents, patient types characterized by a discount factor of 1 = 1, and impatient types
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characterized by a discount factor 0 < 1
 
:13 The distribution of types in the population evolves
endogenously with qt 2 [0; 1] corresponding to the share of patient types in generation t: At the
time of their birth agents are of no particular type. Their degree of patience is instead shaped
through a socialization process controlled by their parents along the lines of the transmission
mechanism of Bisin and Verdier (2001) described below.14
4.1 Parental Utility
Parents make their socialization decisions with implicit concerns about the well-being of their
children. In addition to their own utility they care about the amount of leisure and consumption
enjoyed by their children. However, they evaluate those based on their own utility function and
thus based on their own discount factor.15 In particular, for a parent of type i born in period



















Parents, apart from their leisure, lit 1; and consumption, c
i
t; can also choose the amount of e¤ort





i) = ln lit 1 +
i ln cit. v
j
t 1(
i) corresponds to the indirect utility of a j-type child as perceived by an i-type
parent. P ij(dit) denotes the probability of an i-type parent of having a j-type child after having




2 reects the utility cost of socialization, with 
being a parameter for which we assume  > maxf~v1 + ln ( 1)h^L
(1 ) ; ~v
0 + ln   0 ln ( 1)h^L
(1 ) g.16
Finally, I() is an indicator function with ~vi  0 reecting the additional utility enjoyed by
parents when having a child that shares their degree of patience.
The inclusion of the component ~vi in the parental utility function ensures that ceteris paribus
parents will prefer to have a child which shares their cultural attributes.17 This component
reects the notion of identity as modelled by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). Drawing on extensive
work in psychology and sociology, Akerlof and Kranton suggest that an agents utility increases
13In what follows we use the superscripts i = 1 and i = 0 to denote variables referring to the patient and
impatient types respectively.
14The restriction to a dichotomous cultural attribute is without much loss of generality. As Bisin, Topa, and
Verdier (2009) demonstrate, the cultural transmission mechanism can be generalized to the case of multiple
cultural attributes.
15This means that parents are assumed to be imperfectly altruistic toward their children. See Bisin and Verdier
(2010) for more details on this point.
16We impose this restriction on the value of  to make parental utility and socialization costs comparable in
terms of magnitudes. This enables us to interpret the e¤ort levels dit as probabilities of direct socialization as
explained in the next subsection.
17For the analysis of this section we let this component be xed and only vary across types. In the paper
appendix we discuss the more general case where ~vi varies over time depending on the representation of each type
in the population.
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or decreases through actions that respectively a¢ rm or conict with their perceived identities.
These identities, which in our context correspond to their membership in the group of patient
or impatient agents, provide an additional distinct motivation for parental socialization e¤orts
beyond the concerns for their childrens well-being.
In this respect, our cultural transmission mechanism slightly deviates from the typical cul-
tural transmission mechanism of Bisin and Verdier, where concerns for identity are implicit. In
particular, Bisin and Verdier (2001) assume that parents are "culturally intolerant," namely they
prefer children with similar rather than di¤erent cultural attributes. They do not distinguish,
though, whether this is due to their misperception of childrens well-being or to paternalistic
considerations related to their perceived identity. On the contrary, Cohen-Zada (2006), Algan,
Mayer, and Thoenig (2013), and Doepke and Zilibotti (2012) suggest that identity preserva-
tion constitutes an additional potential objective of parental socialization and explicitly model
it as part of the parental utility function. Moreover, Cohen-Zada (2006) and Algan, Mayer,
and Thoenig (2013) provide also empirical evidence indicating the importance of identity con-
siderations in parental socialization decisions based respectively on religious school choices in
the United States and rst-name-giving patterns among Arabic immigrants in France. In what
follows, we analyze how the strength of this component of parental preference inuences their
socialization decisions and hence the transmission of patience across generations.
4.2 Human Capital and Occupational Choices
Given the nature of the parental utility function, leisure and consumption choices of parents
can be studied in isolation from their choices regarding child socialization. The former can be
analyzed in the same fashion as in Lemmata 1 and 2. They imply that impatient agents will
optimally decide not to accumulate human capital and just seek unskilled employment, while
patient agents will only choose skilled employment as long as vSt 1(1) > v
U
t 1(1): We summarize
the optimal choices of both types of agents in the following two corollaries.
Corollary 2 All impatient agents with 0 < 1
 
in the economy will optimally decide not to invest
in human capital and will always choose to work as unskilled.
Corollary 3 All patient agents in the economy with 1 = 1 will optimally decide to devote a
fraction l^1 = 1
 
of their leisure time during childhood to accumulate human capital h^1 = e  1
and as adults will opt for skilled employment as long as qt  ~q  1  1   1  Lh^1 : Otherwise, if
qt > ~q; some type 1 agents will choose to work as unskilled to unsure that vSt 1(1)=v
U
t 1(1).
Corollary 3 implies that the share of skilled labor employment in the economy, ^t; is given
by the following expression:
^t =
(
qt if qt  ~q




This is because impatient agents cannot work as skilled and hence the share of skilled employment
in the economy is constrained by the number of patient agents, LSt  qtL: Thus, the comparative
statics derived in Lemma 2 only hold in the case where qt > ~q:
Corollary 4 For a given qt; increases in the elasticity of output with respect to intermediate
goods, ; the cost gap between innovators and imitators, ; the productivity of research and
development, ; the returns to education,  ; and the size of the economy, L; all have immediate
positive e¤ects on the share of skilled labor, ^t; provided that qt > ~q:
4.3 Parental Socialization Decisions
Turning now to the decisions of parents regarding socialization e¤orts we follow Bisin and Verdier
(2001) and assume that the transmission of cultural attributes from parents to children (vertical
transmission) is imperfect and parents can only transmit their own attribute with some prob-
ability. Specically, we let the probability for type-i parents of directly transmitting their type
to their children in period t equal the e¤ort dit they put into the childs socialization. Hence
dit 2 [0; 1]:18 If parents are unsuccessful in directly transmitting their type to their children, the
latter pick their type through interaction with other adult individuals (oblique transmission).
Since the likelihood of interaction with adults of each type depends on their representation in
the society, whenever vertical transmission fails, children become patient with probability qt and
impatient with probability 1  qt.19 Thus, the overall probability of a patient adult agent having
a patient child in period t is:
P 11t (d
1
t ) = d
1
t + (1  d1t )qt:
Similarly, the transmission probabilities for the other three possible cases can be written as:
P 10t (d
1
t ) = (1  d1t )(1  qt);
P 01t (d
0
t ) = (1  d0t )qt;
P 00t (d
0
t ) = d
0
t + (1  d0t )(1  qt):
(17)
The e¤ort levels d1t and d
0
t are determined optimally by parents in order to balance out the
costs and benets of child-socialization. Specically, when deciding on the amount of e¤ort to
exert in socializing their children, parents contemplate on the leisure and occupational choices
that their children will make later in life and the utility levels that these choices will generate.
18It should be noted that the case d0t = d
1
t = 1 is equivalent to a case of pure genetic transmission of patience,
which -as we mentioned in Section 1- has also attracted some attention in the literature. This channel has
been deliberately muted in our analysis by the assumption of each parent having exactly one child, so that the
discussion remains focused on the cultural nature of the transmission process.
19In the literature oblique transmission is typically assumed to be unbiased. In principle, one could also consider
formulations where oblique transmission is biased towards one of the two types. See Boyd and Richerson (1985)
for more details on this point.
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However, as explained above, parents are imperfectly altruistic. When evaluating their childrens
well-being they do so using their own discount factor i. Moreover, we assume that parents
cannot predict childrens future wages, but instead simply expect that their children will be
facing the same wage structure that they faced as adults.20 ;21 Given these assumptions, the
perceived indirect utilities of each type of parent as a function of the type of the child are as
follows:
v1t 1(
1)  vSt 1(1) v1t 1(0)  vSt 1(0)
v0t 1(
1)  vUt 1(1) v0t 1(0)  vUt 1(0)
(18)
Substituting expressions (17) and (18) in the parental utility function (15) we can obtain the
optimal choices for d1t and d
0
t , which are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The optimal parental socialization e¤ort of each type of agents is strictly inversely
related to its population representation and given by the following expressions:
d^1t =




if qt  ~q




0+ln  0 ln ( 1)h^1L(1 qt)
(1 )





if qt > ~q
9=; : (20)
Proof. Parental utility of both types of agents is strictly concave in dit: Thus a unique solution to




(1 ) g ensures that the optimal values are strictly interior, d^jt 2 (0; 1): Thus, the





1)  v0t 1(1)) and d^0t = qt (v0t 1(0)  v1t 1(0)) respectively. Substituting in the
values for wSt and w
U
t and noting the dependence of these values on whether qt R ~q we obtain







The result of Lemma 3 implies the presence of a minority e¤ect, as discussed in Bisin and
Verdier (2001). The lower the current representation of a given type in the society, the more e¤ort
parents of this type exert in socializing their children. This feature is central to the dynamics of
cultural transmission and guarantees that the process will not lead to a complete homogenization
20Note that under the above described occupational choices of type 1 agents it does not matter whether parents
expect patient children to work as skilled or unskilled. This is because the indirect utility of patient agents
working as unskilled is the same as of those working as skilled.
21The qualitative results of the model would be the same if parents formed rational expectations about the
wage environment that their children will be facing. Yet, in the context of the present exposition, we make the
simplifying assumption that parents form naive expectations about future wages as the assumption of rational ex-
pections would greatly complicate the analysis of the dynamical system described in Section 4.4 without changing
the qualitative nature of the results.
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of the society as shown below.
4.4 Equilibrium under Cultural Heterogeneity
4.4.1 Evolution of Patience
To characterize the dynamic behavior of the economy over time it is su¢ cient to study the
evolution of the sole state variable, the share of patient agents in the population, qt: The evolution











t )(1  qt): (21)
Substituting in the corresponding transmission probabilities from (17) and simplifying we derive
that qt+1 = qt[1 + (d^1t   d^0t )(1   qt)]: Finally, using the results of Lemma 3 and rearranging the










f~v1   qt[~v1 + ~v0 + (1  0) ln ]g if qt > ~q
)
(22)
4.4.2 Stationary Equilibria and Transitional Dynamics
Given the law of motion (22), it is natural to consider whether the distribution of patient types
converges to a stationary distribution. It turns out that this is indeed the case. The following
proposition discusses the set of stationary values and their stability.
Proposition 1 The set of stationary values for the share of patient types in the economy, qt;
consists of q0 = 0; q1 = 1 and qint 2 (0; 1): Depending on the values for ~v1 and ~v0; it is possible
for qint to be either above or below ~q: In either case, qt ! qint for any q0 2 (0; 1):
Proof. For values qt  ~q the dynamics of the share of patient types in the economy are governed
by the rst expression in equation (22). It is easy to see that qt+1 = 0 whenever qt = 0 as
well as for any value less than ~q that satises the equation H(q)  ~v1   q(~v1 + ~v0) + [1  q(1 
0)] ln(( 1)h^
1L(1 q)
(1 ) )   ln = 0: Noting that H(0) > 0 and dHdq < 0 it is clear that there is at
most one additional stationary value in the range 0 < qt  eq: Since H(~q) = (1  ~q)~v1  ~q~v0  ~q(1 
0) ln ? 0 it is evident that there is an interior stationary value q in the range qt  eq provided
that ~q  ~v1
~v1+~v0+(1 0) ln : Otherwise, q
0 = 0 will be the only stationary value. Furthermore,
provided that the condition ~q  ~v1
~v1+~v0+(1 0) ln holds we can see from (22) that qt+1 > 0 for
any 0 < qt  q and qt+1 < 0 for q < qt  ~q, which renders the interior stationary value q
stable and the boundary value at q0 = 0 unstable.
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For values qt > ~q the dynamics of the share of patient types in the economy are governed by
the second expression in (22). For this range of values we have that qt+1 = 0 whenever qt = 1 or
qt =
~v1
(~v1+~v0)+(1 0) ln . The interior solution q
int = ~v
1
(~v1+~v0)+(1 0) ln will be in the admissible range
qt > ~q provided that eq < ~v1(~v1+~v0)+(1 0) ln . Otherwise q1 = 1 will be the only stationary value.
Furthermore, equation (22) implies that qt+1 ? 0 whether qt 7 ~v
1
(~v1+~v0)+(1 0) ln , which renders
q1 = 1 unstable and qint stable, provided that it is admissible.
Thus, there is a unique interior stationary value qint given by:
qint =
(
q if eq  ~v1
(~v1+~v0)+(1 0) ln 
~v1
(~v1+~v0)+(1 0) ln if eq < ~v1(~v1+~v0)+(1 0) ln 
)
; (23)
with q being dened implicitly by H(q) = 0:
The dependency of the interior steady state share of patient types on the values of the model
parameters implies the following comparative static results.
Corollary 5 The long-run share of patient types in the population is increasing in the discount
factor of impatient types, 0, and the relative strength of the patient parentspreference to preserve
their type, ~v1, and falling in the corresponding one for impatient parents, ~v0. Provided that
qint  ~q the presentation of patient types is increasing in the elasticity of output with respect
to intermediate goods, , the cost gaps between innovators and imitators, , the productivity
of research and development activity, , and the size of the population, L. An increase in the
returns to human capital,  , has an ambiguous e¤ect on qint if qint  ~q and a negative e¤ect if
qint > ~q.22
As the corollary makes clear, a more favorable economic environment for innovators will
only inuence the long-run distribution of patience in the economy if there are di¤erences in
the perceived earnings of di¤erent types in the economy, which is the case as long as qt < eq.
Otherwise, the long-run distribution will be determined solely by the relative strength of parental
preferences to preserve their types, ~v1 and ~v0, the discount factor of impatient types, 0, and the
returns to human capital,  :
22This is due to the fact that higher returns to human capital raise on the one hand the earnings of skilled
agents, but on the other hand also lead to a reduction in leisure. Thus an increase in  has an ambiguous e¤ect
on the relative indirect utilities -as perceived by parents- of patient and impatient children.
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4.4.3 Equilibrium Growth Rate
Proposition 1 together with equation (10) implies that in the long-run the growth rate of per-
capita output in the economy will be constant and given by
g =
(
(   1)h^1qL if eq  ~v1
(~v1+~v0)+(1 0) ln 




Given the dependence of qon ~q and on the model parameters we have the following compar-
ative static results regarding the economys long-run growth rate:
Corollary 6 The growth rate of the economy in its unique interior stationary equilibrium de-
pends positively on the elasticity of output with respect to intermediate goods, ; the magnitude
of innovations, ; the cost gap between innovators and imitators, ; the productivity of research
and development, ; the returns to education,  ; and the size of the economy, L: Provided that
the steady state share of patient types in the economy is below ~q; the growth rate is increasing in
the relative strength of the patient parentspreference to preserve their type, ev1, and falling in
the corresponding one of impatient parents, ev0:
In the following section, we compare what our model implies for the rates of long-run growth
for a culturally heterogeneous society and a homogeneous society consisting only of patient
types. This o¤ers an extreme, yet instructive, comparison regarding the e¤ects that the cultural
composition of a society can have on its course of economic development.
5 Implications for Comparative Development
Contrary to most existing growth models where cultural attributes are treated as exogenously
xed, in our model the cultural attribute of interest, patience, evolves endogenously with the
economic environment. This allows us to address important questions regarding the inuence
that culture can have on comparative economic development and vice versa. Specically, let
us consider a comparison between two economies A and B for which the population size, L;
and the model structural parameters (; ; ; ; ;  ) are the same. The only di¤erence between
the two economies lies in the distribution of patience among individuals agents. In economy
A the population is homogeneous with all individuals being perfectly patient, i.e. all agents
are characterized by a discount factor of 1; and thus, qA0 = 1: In economy B the population
is heterogeneous as in Section 4, with patient agents having a discount factor of 1 and others
discounting the future based on a factor 0 < 1= : Let the initial share of patient agents in
economy B be low, qB0 < ~q: Given these premises let us assess how the cultural di¤erences
between the two countries will inuence their respective development paths.
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For economy A; following the analysis of Section 3, it is clear that the equilibrium share of
skilled employment will be ~q: Moreover, as there are no transition dynamics, the economy will
instantaneously jump to this equilibrium and grow at the rate gAss = (   1)h^1~qL in all time
periods. For economy B, however, due to the initial low share of patient agents, as discussed in
section 4.3, the share of skilled employment will initially be constrained by the share of patient
agents, B0 = q
B
0 < ~q: Thus, the growth rate of economy B will be g
B
0 = (   1)h^1qB0 L; which
is lower than that in A. This implies that the GDP levels of the two economies will begin to
diverge.
Since the overall degree of patience is endogenous in our model, though, over time in economy
B a virtuous circle will kick in. This is because the greater returns to skilled employment, which
exceed those to unskilled employment as long as Bt < ~q, will induce parents to socialize their
children to become more patient. This will lead over time to an increase in the number of patient
agents in the population and at the same time ease the constraint on skilled labor in the R&D
sector. Consequently this implies that over time the growth rate of economy B will rise.
Will this process enable economyB to catch up with economyA? This depends on whether the
steady state growth rate of economyB will remain below gAss or not. Given the dynamics of growth
in our model economy, this hinges on whether the steady state share of skilled employment in
economy B will be increasing to or staying below ~q. In the former case, there will be no di¤erences
in the equilibrium growth rates between A and B and over time the GDP gap between the two
economies will stabilize. In the latter case, the growth rate in B will remain permanently below
that of economy A and the two economies will diverge indenitely.
Given the invariance of the models structural parameters between the two economies, which
of the two scenarios will materialize depends crucially on the values of ~v1 and ~v0; the strength
of parental preferences for having children who share their cultural attributes. In particular, as
we can see from (23), the steady state share of skilled employment in country B will be q < ~q if
condition (1  ~q)~v1  ~q~v0  ~q(1  0) ln < 0 is satised. In that case, the resulting steady state
growth rate will be gBss = ( 1)h^qL < gAss: On the contrary, if (1 ~q)~v1 ~q~v0 ~q(1 0) ln > 0,
then over time the skilled employment share in country B will increase to ~q and the growth rate
will converge to that of country A.
To understand the intuition behind the above condition that determines the capacity of







1  ~q (1  
0) ln : (25)
This condition indicates that ~v1; the parameter reecting the intrinsic preference of patient
parents to have children who are like them independently of the economic returns to patience,
should be strong enough to overcome ~v0 - the corresponding preference parameter of impatient
parents - as well as the di¤erence in the perceived economic benets to patience between patient
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and impatient agents, (1   0) ln ; corrected for their relative shares in the population at the
threshold point, ~q
1 ~q .
What is evident from the above discussion is that in the absence of any intrinsic preferences
of parents to preserve their type, namely when ~v1 = ~v0 = 0; condition (25) is not satised
and the steady state value of qBt will be below ~q: Hence, the share of skilled employment in
country B will remain permanently below that of country A and so will its growth rate. This
implies that the development paths of a culturally homogeneous and a heterogeneous society are
bound to diverge, as long as the transmission of attitudes regarding patience across generations
is solely governed by the relative perceived market returns to patience. What is necessary in
order for divergence between the two economies to be avoided is the presence of an additional
force promoting the dissemination of patience. This force is coming from parental preferences,
in particular from the desire of patient parents to see their children carrying the same cultural
attribute as them. The proposition below summarizes the above result.
Proposition 2 Consider two economies, A and B; that are similar in all aspects apart from the
initial distribution of attitudes regarding patience, with qA0 = 1 and q
B
0 < ~q: If the transmission of
cultural attributes is governed by the above described mechanism, the two economies will in the
long run grow at the same rate (gAss = g
B




1 ~q (1 0) ln : Otherwise
gAt > g
B
t in all time periods.
The above result may appear initially surprising, yet there is a simple intuition behind it.
In the absence of cultural heterogeneity, agents will sort themselves into skilled and unskilled
occupations up to the point where lifetime earnings in the two occupations, as perceived by
patient agents, are equalized. The presence of impatient agents alters this equilibrium as their
heavier discounting of future income induces them to only consider the unskilled employment
option. In the short-run, this will lead to a temporary deviation from the benchmark labor market
equilibrium. However, if attitudes regarding patience are subject to change across generations
and their evolution is responsive to market returns to patience, it is natural to expect that
over time the economy would return to the benchmark equilibrium prevailing in the absence of
cultural heterogeneity.
The reason this does not happen is the presence of an important friction in the cultural
transmission process. Parents in our model economy are only imperfectly altruistic toward their
children and their socialization decisions are biased by their own degree of patience. Specically,
since impatient agents heavily discount the benets that their children would enjoy as skilled
workers in their second period of life, their socialization decision is biased against patience. As a
consequence, the prevailing long-run equilibrium under cultural heterogeneity involves an under-
representation of patience in the population and a lower share of skilled employment compared
to the benchmark labor market equilibrium.
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6 Concluding Remarks
The present paper has demonstrated how combining an innovation-based model of endogenous
growth with a cultural transmission mechanism enables the study of the interplay between the
mechanics of economic growth and the process of cultural change. Focusing our attention on
patience, a cultural attribute central for intertemporal decision-making, we have analyzed the
conditions under which societies that are characterized by di¤erent degrees of patience will end up
following di¤erent development paths. This allows us to address important questions regarding
the extent to which a societys culture can impose a constraint on its long-run growth potential.
The main conclusion that emerges from our analysis is that in an environment where culture
is subject to change across generations, the initial cultural composition of a society is not bound
to hold back the process of economic development. Specically, we have shown that even a
society where patience is initially underrepresented in the population can make up for it and in
the long run grow at the same rate as a society of perfectly patient economic agents. However,
in order for this to happen it is not su¢ cient that the intergenerational transmission of patience
is responsive to the relative economic returns to patience. Patient parents need to have an
additional intrinsic motivation to instill patience in their children. This is necessary in order
to overcome the socialization decisions of impatient agents, whose distorted assessment of the
returns to patience biases the cultural transmission process in the opposite direction.
Moreover, our analysis of the dynamic interaction between patience and economic growth
o¤ers a set of testable predictions regarding their joint evolution over the course of economic
development and how they can inuence the choices of economic agents regarding human capital
accumulation and occupation. In particular, our theory suggests that di¤erences in patience
across individuals should be associated with di¤erences in incomes, education, and the steepness
of income proles, predictions that have been supported by evidence from Lawrance (1991),
Atkeson and Ogaki (1996), and Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002). It also suggests more
generally an overall increase in patience as economies develop, a prediction corroborated by
Hansson and Stuart (1990), Becker and Mulligan (1997), and Clark (2007). Most importantly,
it suggests that the presence of greater returns to patience will induce parents to inuence
their children to become more patient, leading to a di¤usion of patience within the population.
Although our analysis here has been theoretical, we consider an empirical assessment of this
prediction a potentially fruitful avenue for further research.
Finally, we would like to stress that although in the context of the present paper we have
chosen to focus our attention on patience, the general structure of our model is exible enough and
can be easily applied to investigate the coevolution of economic development and various other
cultural attributes.23 Thus, we believe that our analysis can provide important insights regarding
23Klasing (2012) uses a similar setup as this paper to study the interaction of risk preferences and economic
development, while Doepke and Zilibotti (2013) suggest the use of a closely related framework for the more general
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the extent to which culture should be understood as a fundamental determinant of economic
development of not.24 In this respect, our results should raise caution against treating cultural
attributes as exogenous to economic development given the natural ways in which changes in the
economic environment may induce cultural change. At the same time, they suggest that although
values and attitudes are subject to change over time, this does not necessarily imply that culture
is perfectly malleable and will have no e¤ect on a countrys path of economic development.
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Appendix: Varying Parental Attachment toOwnCultural Attributes
One limitation of the analysis o¤ered in the main body of the paper is that the strength of
parental preferences to preserve their own cultural attributes are treated as something exogenous
and independent of the dynamics of cultural transmission. Here, we consider an alternative sce-
nario, where we allow these preferences for each group of agents to vary with their representation
in the population. As we demonstrate below, the qualitative nature of the cultural transmis-
sion dynamics and the model equilibrium do not change when this more natural assumption is
introduced.
In the context of the culturally heterogeneous society described in Section 4, let us now














Note that the additional utility that parents enjoy when having a child that shares their cul-
tural attributes now depends on qt: Specically, for the purpose of the present analysis, let us
parametrize the function ~vi(qt) as follows:
~vi(qt) =

~v1(1  qt)2 if i = 1
~v0q2t if i = 0

:
Just as in Sections 4 and 5, ~v1; ~v0  0 can still be interpreted as reecting the preference of parents
for a child sharing their cultural attribute. But the di¤erence is that here ~vi corresponds to the
additional utility enjoyed when type i agents are an innitesimal minority in the population,
while the strength of these preferences weakens as type is representation increases and vanishes
in the limit as type i agents come to dominate the population.
How does this modication a¤ect parental socialization choices and the dynamics of cultural










if qt  ~q













if qt > ~q
9=; (27)
The key di¤erence compared to the previous case is that the amount of e¤ort exerted by parents

















> 0:25 Substituting the above expressions into equation (21) we obtain the new














The new law of motion for qt can be analyzed in the same way as in Section 4. Despite
its higher-order nature compared to equation (21), the resulting dynamics are qualitatively un-
changed. Thus, following the steps outlined in Proposition 1, we can prove the existence of three
stationary points. Two of them, q0 = 0 and q1 = 1; are unstable and one of them, qint, is stable,




< eq if ~v1(1  ~q)3   ~q3~v0   ~q(1  0) ln < 0
 eq if ~v1(1  ~q)3   ~q3~v0   ~q(1  0) ln  0

; (29)
Although we cannot explicitly solve for qint; using the implicit function theorem it can be shown
that, just as in the previous case, @q
int
~v1
> 0 and @q
int
~v0
< 0: We summarize this result in a
proposition.
Proposition 3 The set of stationary values for the share of patient types, qt; in the economy
with varying parental attachment to their cultural attributes consists of q0 = 0; q1 = 1 and
qint 2 (0; 1); with qt ! qint for any q0 2 (0; 1): Depending on the values for ~v1; ~v0; 0 and  it is








The rest of the analysis of Sections 4 and 5 can follow through as before with the only di¤erence
being that the critical value that ~v1 has to exceed in order for the culturally heterogeneous society






(1  ~q)3 (1  
0) ln : (30)
25In the terminology of Bisin and Verdier (2001), this modication of the parental preferences strengthens the
minority e¤ect on their socialization decisions.
25
